Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress by Krislov, Samuel
Cornell Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 6 July 1971 Article 6
Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress
Samuel Krislov
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel Krislov, Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1031 (1971)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol56/iss6/6
BOOK REVIEW
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL.
New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row. 1970. Pp. xii,
210. $6.50.
The first wave of review of this volume was extravagantly favor-
able.1 Not only those who agreed with Bickel's intellectual and ideologi-
cal position, but also those who have different views of the art and
craft of judging, heaped lavish praise upon both the author and his
work.2 They suggested it was in some sense a definitive exposition of
the principles of Supreme Court self-restraint and a searing indictment
of the Warren Court for indifference to legal niceties, especially its
commitment to change in social policy regardless of the absence of
authority or competence to deal with a matter at hand. Bickel, a former
law clerk to Justice Frankfurter, has distinguished himself as an advo-
cate of the "passive virtues" for judges. This thought seems to mean
that judges should bear in mind the fragile nature of their institutional
power, recognize the limits of their moral authority, and so far as
possible work within highly circumscribed boundaries of action. This
volume, so these early reviews suggested, was the capstone of Bickel's
efforts, of an intellectual vigor and grace fully the equal of Learned
Hand's The Bill of Rights.3
More recently, a new wave of less favorable assessments has ap-
peared, for example, in The New York Review of Books4 and in Trans-
Action.5 These reviewers primarily emphasize their disagreement with
Bickel's assumptions on the judicial role. They indicate that seminal
differences account for their criticism, which is a form of accepting the
book at face value, a compliment in avoidance as it were.
My own view is rather more muddied, though, I would hope,
clearer-visioned. I cannot see how one can gainsay Bickel's basic propo-
sition. All institutions have effective limits. To permit the debate to
continue to center upon this type of question seems rather self-indul-
1 Antippas, Book Review, 45 TUL. L. REv. 218 (1970); Hamilton, Book Review, 56
A.B.A.J. 1195 (1970); Henkin, Book Review, 70 CoLuM. L. R-v. 1494 (1970); Isenbergh,
Book Review, 30 MD. L. REv. 295 (1970); Miller, Book Review, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 166
(1970); Wiecek, Book Review, SATURDAY REv., April 4, 1970, at 37; HAm'as MAGAZINE,
April 1970, at 108.
2 See, e.g., Packer, Book Review, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1970, § 7, at 3.
3 L. HAND, Tm BmL oF Rioirrs (1958).
4 Wasserstrom, Book Review, N.Y. REv. oF Booas, Jan. 7, 1971, at 16.
5 Carter, Book Review, TRANS-AcnoN, Jan. 1971, at 56.
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gent.6 As an extended argument Bickel's effort does not advance the
debate; except by negative enumeration it does not specify the condi-
tions for Court action or inaction. The argument for judicial self-
control is neither adequately developed nor made sufficiently self-
executing, so that one can see the relationship between the fundamental
approach to judicial craftsmanship and the specific policy stands taken.
In short, although I disagree with his assessments of specific policies,
the real problem seems to me not one of Bickel's wrong-headedness on
basic questions, but his failures of execution.
Much of this, it would appear, is a consequence of a glaring
editorial and intellectual miscalculation in publishing "an expanded
and documented version of the 1969 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures."7
Throughout the volume the lectures seem distinguishable from the
additions both in tone and manner of development. The lectures seem
to have been in the nature of a tour de force, a sketch in limn, leaving
much to the imagination. The additional material interrupts the flow
of argument and overdevelops points without really establishing them.
Important assertions are undocumented in a way quite acceptable with
a genre such as lectures, while small points are elaborately overdocu-
mented in the unique fashion of law review articles. The overlay of
new material creates obvious disproportions, with the thin lecture
series constantly threatening to break out from the imprisonment of
the middling-fat book. Piling weight on a butterfly does not turn it into
a bird; it squashes it. The volume should have issued much as given
or sharply recast, with drastically altered emphasis and more even-
handed elaboration of the empirical evidence where appropriate,
rather than in occasional hit-and-miss style.
I
The basic fabric of The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress
is woven in imitation of Carl Becker's great, enriching, and ebullient
lectures, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.8
Bickel specifically compares some Justices-the ambiguity is Bickel's,
not mine-with Becker's view of the philosophes, in that they were at
least nominally rationalists coming after an age of faith, but deep down
unconsciously unable to free themselves from much the same sort of
6 Cf. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
7 P. xi.
8 C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PmLosoPHERs (1932).
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controlling beliefs as their predecessors. Bickel is unrelenting in his
attribution of an unconscious, lingering, naive faith to the Warren
Court majority (excepting only Justice Black whom he sees as an overt
man of faith, having beliefs with a different content but not structure
from the previous tradition).
This argument is not completely satisfactory; some of the post-
lecture tinkering may have been an effort to make his notions more
parallel to Becker's. Bickel explicitly deals with "the heavenly city
of the twentieth-century justices" encompassing them all as successors
to "men of faith" like Brewer who were, he asserts on the basis of
various scraps of quotations assembled by Ralph Gabriel, Constitution
worshippers. Although it is not vital to the rest of the book, only to
Bickel's schema, I will record my feeling that Miller, Field, Gray,
Bradley, and many other of the previous Justices do not fit his mold in
any way. It is, however, important to note that his "twentieth-century
justices" seem to include Holmes, Brandeis, the Warren Court, and a
few culls from the Roosevelt Court-and no one else. Taft, Bickel
seems to say, was a man of the old faith pretending to other values to
keep with the times; Hughes was suspect to those of the old faith;
Murphy (and perhaps Rutledge) on the other hand, are not, it would
appear, twentieth-century Justices. In short, we have a classification
system that does not classify. More importantly, perhaps, it mingles
style and substance in an unsatisfactory manner. Llewellyn's analysis
of nineteenth- and twentieth-century styles,9 which may well have been
Bickel's stimulus, seems to me both more dearly defined and more
consistently applicable.
To a large extent then, Bickel merely rewarms the old chestnut
of the Holmes-Brandeis legacy and reasserts his mentor, Frankfurter's,
originality. The progressive realists like Holmes and Brandeis could
not and did not abandon faith at all, he suggests. They clung to the due
process clause and Court protection of human rights, without resolving
the dilemma of contradiction with democratic theory. Holmes was
largely spared the need by his judicial aloofness and the luck that
cases squarely facing these problems did not arise. Brandeis believed
so firmly in all his tenets that he could not see contradictions of the
same sort that Bickel suggests the Warren Court must have seen but
blandly ignored. Only Frankfurter was merciless with himself intel-
lectually; history and self-discipline forced him to make choices.
Frankfurter does not emerge as perfect, though he has precious few
9 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COiMVON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs (1960).
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blemishes. Bickel suggests Frankfurter's flag salute decision 0 may
have been the product of an extra-constitutional image of "the public
schools as secular, nationalizing agencies,"" an image Bickel finds old-
fashioned and dispensible. More significantly Frankfurter, though
successful in differentiating between judicial roles and the developing
of techniques for handling them, succeeded more in defining his dilem-
mas than solving them.
[H]e never successfully identified sources from which this judgment
was to be drawn that would securely limit as well as nourish it, he
never achieved a rigorous general accord between judicial suprem-
acy and democratic theory, so that the boundaries of the one
could be described with some precision in terms of the other, and
he was thus unable to ensure that the teaching of a duty of judg-
ment would be received as subordinate to the teaching of absten-
tion . . .. :12
It is strange to think of Frankfurter's legacy as one of judicial activism;
Bickel's Frankfurter is not precisely the judge who filed an opinion
labeled dubitante'3-surely one of the most self-indulgent acts of Su-
preme Court history-or who held that alien cannery workers who were
considering work in Alaska had to risk being denied readmittance to
the country before the case could be adjudicated.14 But this portrait of
the over-assertive Frankfurter is the necessary backdrop for Bickel's
implicit claim that he is perfecting the Frankfurter approach by em-
bellishing and honing the grounds for withholding judgment.
It is curious that after several published volumes, 15 Bickel has yet
to present us with a coherent view of judging. His contribution thus far
is a series of negative injunctions. Typically he darts in on a subject,
starting in its middle and arguing with a developed proposition ad-
vanced by another writer. Gerald Gunther has argued in his brilliant
article' 6 that Bickel's ideal court is-the simile is my own-rather like
the spinster saving herself for a destined husband, ignorant of the fact
that she is training herself never to find him. Bickel's injunctions,
derived from his criticism of cases, seem by a process of negations to add
up to the following: the process of judging is one of formulating "neu-
10 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 US. 586 (1940).
11 P. 33. See also p. 123.
12 p. 34.
13 Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
14 ILWU v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
15 See, e.g., THE Nvw AGE OF POLrTICAL REFORM (1968); PoLrrcs AND THE WARREN
COR (1965); THE LE.sr DANsmous BRANCH (1962).
16 Gunther, supra note 6.
1034 [Vol. 56:1031
tral principles" that can resolve practical problems--craftsmanship
joined with statesmanship. Clearly the former is the preeminent skill.
Heavily endorsing Herbert Wechsler's notion that good judging re-
quires such neutral principles, 17 Bickel adds little to the concreteness
of that intriguing phrase. Wechsler's thrust seems to be that rules
should apply to all cases, and that a case should be decided in such a
way that the rule will in fact be applied to all cases falling within its
domain. Where such results are not feasible, Bickel argues, the Court
should if at all possible avoid decision. The Court is particularly culpa-
ble if it takes a case on certiorari and then botches it, less so if it is
forced upon the Court on direct appeal. The Justices should be deeply
cognizant of their paradoxical anti-democratic position in society, and
be meticulously reluctant to intrude into local matters. The Court must
avoid taking on more burdens than it can handle and convincingly
justify in terms of legal principles and political theory.
There is throughout the volume a mystifying assumption that
these principles are self-defining. Bickel thereby avoids the problems of
ordering them. When in conflict he moves airily back and forth with
easy victories over the Justices, creating for them something like an
analytic Catch-22. In the apportionment decisions for example, the
Justices are faulted for not taking into account local conditions, that
is, for inadequate statesmanship. Of course, had they done so Bickel
would have found them guilty of inadequate craftsmanship.
His failure to apply the principles systematically is revealed by his
unwillingness to give the Court credit for arriving at a precise neutral
principle in the apportionment cases. This is handled through the
device of quoting dissents of Justices who find themselves in disagree-
ment in one case and then impeaching the dissenter for his participa-
tion with the majority in another. Bickel gives us ironic confirmation
of his own capriciousness, even as he chides the Court for the same sin.
Piously he finds the key to the apportionment decisions in the Court's
sic volo, sic jubeo ingeniousness in a said-to-be revealing sentence or
word: "Said Justice Douglas: 'The conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Ad-
dress, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.' "is "The key word,"
Bickel informs, "is can," presumably because Douglas is being arbitrary
about an ambiguous matter.19 But amusingly enough Bickel parallels
17 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
18 P. 13, quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 US. 368, 381 (1963).
19 P. 13.
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this by telling us, in commenting on Fortson v. Morris,20 that "the
apportionment decisions could not have been as 'merely much ado
about form.' "21 The key word is could.
Bickel tries to escape crediting the Court with arriving at a neutral
principle of rather precise import in the apportionment cases by telling
us they must have embraced a global, self-defeating one-absolute
majoritarianism. He easily has the better of the argument when he gets
into the odd history of how the Court backed into its stand, but prefers
to attack by his own version of what the "one-man, one-vote rule"
must mean. If the Warren majority do not understand their own
rule, it is they who are at fault! Surely this is a prime example of what
Bickel calls leaning on "the crutch that wasn't there."22
Both Wechfler and Bickel have no use for the decision that is
inchoate, that puts forward a theory without embracing it, the judicial
trial balloon. Clearly such means belong to the realm of statesmanship,
even if the rule suggested may in fact be the purest gold of craftsman-
ship. The shadowy process of incorporation of rights under the four-
teenth amendment, the Carolene Products footnote,23 even the invisible
irradiations from Gomillion v. Lightfoot24 that led to Baker v. Carr,25
indicate the prevalence of such ambiguous lines of development. There
is something surely to be said for judicial craftsmanship of the type of
Charles Evans Hughes, who was said to construct every sentence with
an escape hatch for the judges. This is no doubt cautionary overkill,
but it has always been regarded as one of the virtues of the common law
that its principles are pragmatically unravelled rather than revealed in
a whirligig of instant articulation. One senses in Bickel a desire for a
curious phenomenon: code law legislated by judges.
Thus, Bickel has no patience with Flast v. Cohen,26 which ex-
panded the standing of taxpayers to sue in the federal courts, because
the Justices had not the courage to embrace a clear rule.27 It would
be useless to suggest that the decision represents their finest hour, but
he must be aware that the Vinson Court's decisions in this area were
no cleaner, even when Frankfurter wrote the opinions. The fear of
opening the floodgates of litigation leads to backing and filling. What
is essentially a rule on access to the Court presents special problems
20 885 U.S. 231 (1966).
21 P. Ill (emphasis added).
22 P. 47.
23 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 804 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1988).
24 364 U.S. 889 (1960).
25 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26 892 U.S. 83 (1968).
27 Pp. 68-65.
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not necessarily on all fours with Court decisions enunciated as a legal
resolution of a social problem.
There are other standards of judging and standards of success.
Can we not all share the admiration for Harlan's Yates28 decision which
defused the communist control issue without antagonizing Congress,
or for the skill of Van Devanter who supposedly could write decisions
creating no precedents? Flast, as Bickel notes, can be read by the Court
as a unique event or an expansible rule in the light of circumstances. 29
Why this is always worse than ducking the issue on even fictitious
grounds is not made clear. Bickel's attitude here is similar to his odd
indignation that the prospective nature of the Miranda° rule was
modified by the Court's exception for the plaintiff.31 It is as if a
consistently arbitrary and far-reaching rule based upon necessity is
purer than one with a single exception, based upon a clear principle
of its own, and one that recognizes the fact that plaintiffs are more
likely to carry up cases if self-interest is involved than as a public
service.
Bickel does indicate an awareness that some areas are less suscep-
tible than others to generalization, some where ad hoc decisions are
suddenly defensible. The area so described is, perhaps unexpectedly,
that of free speech, an exception mentioned in a subordinate clause and
never elaborated upon.32 Why this area should be so abstracted is not
explained. Great care is taken, however, to indicate that only where
there is overt restriction on free speech or direct discrimination against
a group is there a violation of the Constitution or a justification for
Court intervention. His reasoning is, in process terms, that virtually all
legislation by majorities potentially impedes in some indirect way
minority rights; and therefore, so he suggests, there is no analytic
difference in "chilling effect" arguments justifying a more aggressive
role by the judges. How he reconciles these paradoxical, if not contra-
dictory, positions is not clear. Surely freedom of speech and press is not
merely a formal notion, the Court being enjoined to invalidate only
laws that expressly curtail those freedoms. It seems clear the Frank-
furter-Bickel first amendment position is kept murky to avoid collision
of incompatible propositions.
At any rate he rejects the Warren Court approach on such ques-
tions at a level of political theory appropriate for constitution-makers,
28 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
29 P. 76.
30 Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 (1966).
31 Pp. 54-57.
32 P. 77.
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not judges, in a manner not warranted by the materials from which
decision may appropriately be constructed. The argument of the Jus-
tices who are "majoritarians," as Bickel labels them, is actually less
philosophical, more technical, and on a level of generalization much
lower than that on which Bickel chooses to criticize or Frankfurter
chose to operate. The way is then open to attribute motives and philos-
ophies to Justices who have chosen not to express themselves and so win
phony victories. Tie statement of the Warren Court position on ap-
portionment and free speech does not seem to me an adequate repre-
sentation of the many arguments that might underlie its decisions and
the refutation attempted by Bickel is therefore largely irrelevant.
In a larger sense the entire evaluation of the Warren Court is out
of focus. There is no effort to evaluate its contributions to defusing
McCarthyism in free speech cases, although some labor is expended to
redeem Frankfurter's unfortunate and now quaint concurrence in
Dennis33 by juxtaposing the more libertarian Sweezey v. New Hamp-
shire.34 The corpus of decision on the status of films under the first
amendment, the important and powerful decisions on libel and "chill-
ing effects," the right of association decision 5 are as if never enunciated.
Is it really sufficient to treat the Ginzburg36 case, arguably a major
error, as standing for the entire Court's product in the obscenity area,
much as the relatively minor question of retrospective application of
Miranda is the sole discussion of criminal law efforts? It is incredible to
analyze the Warren Court without exploration of the domain of their
achievements, with the admitted incidence of possible error, not just
as a parade of sins. The fact that Bickel misreads the Ginzburg pander-
ing language and suggests the magazine covers involved in Redrup v.
New York37 would be pandering under Ginzburg is incidental to the
fact that only two of the half-dozen or so major areas of Warren Court
achievement are even assessed.
In fact Bickel's specific quarrels with the Court are surprisingly
few, rather more limited than his vehement language suggests. In toto
only fifty-two cases are discussed sufficiently to warrant indexing.
Twenty of these are pre-Warren. Two cases-Frankfurter's, of course-
draw only praise. Of the remaining thirty, five are lower court decisions
(though Bickel seems to hold the Warren majority culpable) and five
others are discussed without any criticism. Bickel's criticism of the
33 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
34 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
85 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
36 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
37 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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entire Warren era rests upon a discussion of only twenty decisions;
disagreement with his characterization of even one case is disagree-
ment with a substantial part of his entire argument. And many of
Bickel's characterizations strike me as doubtful and others as just plain
wrong.
Bickel chides the majority for not answering Harlan's argument
in the poll tax case 38 that the legislature could rationally exclude those
who did not care enough to pay $1.50. 39 But an examination of the case
clearly shows the majority thought the improper exclusion to be those
who could not pay, while Harlan justifies only those who would not.
Perhaps Harlan (and Bickel) would argue there are no such absolutely
impecunious persons in practical terms, but no such argument is in
fact made. Harlan therefore is not responsive to the Court's problem,
and the majority was justified in ignoring his point.
Similarly, Bickel's cavalier rejection of the Court's historical argu-
ment on the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment is
remarkable for one who is contemptuous of others' casual use of proof.
To snort "history it is not"40 of the Court's view and to ipse dixit a
precise intent without reference to a single source is also not history;
it is soothsaying. Bickel's track record for saying sooths, prospective or
retrospective, is not so high that automatic acquiescence is required.
At least the Court had the decency to cite sources for their view-
including Frantz's meticulous and intriguing work.41 Bickel, who has
the time and space to elaborately footnote cognate cases, law-journal
style, should at a minimum have dealt with the Court's cited sources
and at least hinted at his own evidence.
Considering the narrow range of issues covered and the lack of
direction of many criticisms, not to say outright errors, it is difficult to
hail this, in the words of the flyjacket, as "[t]he most important bill of
particulars against the Warren Court yet published." Kurland's is more
consistent in tone and approach and is simply more fun. Wechsler's is
more subtle and McCloskey's more rooted in social and political reali-
ties. 42
38 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 883 U.S. 663 (1966).
39 P. 59.
40 P. 48.
41 Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 nn.7 & 8 (1966), with pp. 47-48
as to historical methodology.
42 Kurland, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143 (1964);
McCloskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REv. 1229 (1965); Wechsler, supra
note 17.
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II
By far the most interesting part of the volume is Lecture IV in
which Bickel projects what he calls an "alternative scenario" to what
he asserts is the Supreme Court dream of integrated, racially homoge-
nized, secularized America. For all of his protestations on analytics,
Bickel's concern and his touch seem more firm and true when policy
concerns are involved. He proceeds to the domain of the practical,
reluctantly, he explains, in acknowledgment of the Warren Court's
preoccupation with the future, and its apparent willingness to be
judged by the unfolding of events. In a larger sense, he acknowledges,
this occurs anyway; an institution is judged by its results and the effects
of its actions.
The Court's effort at reapportionment seems to him of disappoint-
ing quality in terms of the end product, and certainly not worth the
price of what he sees as traumatic change for American society. The
reformed legislatures he notes have not been superior in performance
to their gerrymandered predecessors, and Bickel effectively marshals the
numerous studies which indicate no real change even with respect to
policy direction measured in terms of fiscal expenditures. 43 Desegrega-
tion also was born of good will, of the vision of progress, of faith in the
heavenly city. But it, too, is seen as irrelevant, the Court having seen
the future with its heart and dreamed the wrong dream.
Quite simply Bickel sees decentralized, black, community power
as at least the immediate solution. Therefore, the "one-man, one-vote"
rule is seen as a needless and unfortunate impediment to flexible, varie-
gated arrangements which could be negotiated between the black and
white communities. It also is an impediment to combining present
school districts into socially integrated systems or suburbs and core
city into a metropolitan government, since functional integration
under the "one-man, one-vote" rule means control by one side or
another.
Going beyond these principles he suggests the need for emphasis
on diversity of schools over the notion of the secularized, common
school operating as an integrator and homogenizer of values. To
achieve this end he would undo Warren Court and earlier assertions of
strict separation of church and state. Parochial schools, for example,
should be state subsidized to encourage pluralism in an era when
pluralism is declining.
In the course of the lectures Bickel proffers an aside that political
43 Pp. 165-73.
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scientists all too often discover what lawyers already know. As a mem-
ber of the aforementioned group, I hesitate to comment, lest harsher
rebuke be provided. But it does seem to me that part of the problem is
that Bickel, like Perry Mason, knows things he logically and on evi-
dence could not really be sure of; he writes, in Beard's phrase, "without
fear and without research." His notions of proof and verification are
surprisingly diffuse and ill-formed. And like all of us when we rely
upon internalized unexplored knowledge, he knows a lot that just
is not so.
It is hardly self-evident that virtually the entire black community
is wedded to decentralization, that the ideas of Brandeis are due for
a revival, and that on net the future will see less government rather
than more. To press further for interpretation of all this as a trend
toward greater self-identification of the citizenry as members of groups
rather than individuals seems to me positively willful.
To characterize the black population as core city dwellers for the
foreseeable future is to succumb to the easy stereotype. As the census
reports indicate, the black population has grown dramatically in the
suburbs in the past decade. There are indications this is largely a shift
from core city ghettos to suburban ghettos, but even that means the
governmental problem, though not the social problem, has been dras-
tically altered.
The assertion that legislators can, in practice as opposed to obvious
theoretical possibilities, effectively gerrymander toward desired ends
is easily refuted by experiences everywhere. It is easy to produce a
single result of malapportionment, but any attempt to produce some-
thing like maximum party advantage involves risks and uncertainties
that have defied the legislatures. Bickel cites with glee a Republican
claim that a court order to redistrict in New York would gain the party
six to eight congressional seats in 1970; 44 we now know, as he could
not, that their gain was of two seats, in an election in which the Demo-
cratic party was drastically rebuffed at the gubernatorial and senatorial
level.
Bickel seems prone to assert that the emergence of problems in
an area indicates the basic invalidity of the major decisional premise
under which the Court has intervened. It is not at all clear that the
emphasis on neutral principles is not a disguised faith in judicial
automaticity and the notion that general principles will decide concrete
cases. In any event it is hard to find that the anomalies he points to
create greater difficulties than similar issues in virtually every area of
44 P. 152.
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the law. The myth of the perfect area of the law is as false as the dream
of the perfect, no-need-to-ever-repair house. A lot of improvised day-to-
day tinkering goes on all the time.
The dream of progress as Bickel suggests is open to every man.
Why one should choose a particular dream remains an interesting
question. As predictors of the future, dreams are of course subject
precisely to the test of time. The Warren Court's dreams have, even by
Bickel's admission, sometimes in avoidance, been translated into reali-
ties in a rather surprising number of instances. The Court's record in
performance seems as effective as Bickel's in criticism. And the future
is seldom as even the wisest and most analytic calls it.
Samuel Krislov*
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